In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.
Introduction
Various solutions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] expressing some concern for fairness have been proposed for cooperative games in coalitional form with non-transferable utility (NTU). The main ones are the Harsanyi solution [6] , the Shapley NTU solution [7] , the symmetric egalitarian solution [8] , and the consistent solution [9] . Hart [10] compared the Harsanyi solution, the Shapley NTU solution, and the consistent solution in a simple example.
For games with transferable utility, a strategy is weakly dominated if there exists another strategy of the same player that is never worse and sometimes strictly better with respect to what the other players do. Extant solutions translate TU solution concepts to the NTU case by utilizing endogenously determined utility weight vectors, which can violate notions of equity. Lejano [11] develops a new solution procedure that tries to resolve this longstanding problem. However, there still remains a need for new NTU solution concepts.
The purpose of this paper is to provide two new solution concepts for a NTU game: the refined core and weakly stable set. We begin with introducing the definition of weak dominance in NTU games. After that, we show that the payoffs in core are refined by a subset and give the definition of a weakly stable set and explore the relation among the core, the weakly stable set, and the refined core.
Some Concepts for a NTU Game
Let be a finite set of players. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N. For every
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility is a pair (N, V), where N is the set of players and V is a mapping which for each coalition S, defines a characteristic set
 
The characteristic set V S can be interpreted as the set of outcomes the players in S which can guarantee themselves without cooperating with the player in N S
The core of NTU games is defined by the set of all undominated payoffs. We denote it by , therefore,
t h e r e i s n o ,
, and such that
Weak Dominance and the Refined Core
Given a game with no-transferable utility (N, V), let
x x x x   be a feasible payoff for a player. For the NTU game we study, assume that the scale of players' utility is not always the same and no side payments Copyright © 2012 SciRes. AJOR are allowed. Therefore, the payoffs of players that belong to a coalition S should not be summed up.
which can make the scale of players' utility unanimous. So the utilities of all players are comparable. But his research did not consider the sum of some players' utility that belongs to a coalition. Let K denote the class of NTU-games, and let     , denote a subclass of NTU-games that all players have the same utility scale. Players in subclass can't transfer their utility, but they can research and contrast the sum of some players' utility.

We introduce the definition of weak dominance and draw some conclusions in the subclass  of NTU games by comparing the sum utility of players that belongs to a same coalition.
. y is weakly dominated by x through coalition S (notation:
We use condition 
is a new solution of the NTU game. We use the definition of weak dominance to refine the payoffs in core of the NTU game. Then we get   , C N V  . So it is a refined solution of the NTU game. 
Weakly Stable Set of NTU Game


In NTU games, a stable set is a subset of
No payoff in this subset dominates another. (Internal stability);
Any payoff outside this subset is dominated by some payoff in it. (External stability);
We develop the definition of weak stable sets by the definition of weak dominance of a NTU game and explore the relation among the core and the weakly stable set. If the core is a stable set, it is the unique stable in cooperative games. Gao (1998) proved that the conclusion applies to weakly stable sets of a cooperative game. We show that this applies to weakly stable sets of a NTU game by Theorem 4. 
